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unconstitutional for the State to encourage childbirth over abor-
tions by paying only for the former. Because the State's interest in
protecting potential life cannot outweigh its interest in protecting
the life and health of the mother, no compelling reason for promot-
ing childbirth exists when a woman's life or health is endangered
by her pregnancy. s The New York Court of Appeals should thus
uphold the state supreme court's decision and prevent the State
from discriminating against underprivileged women who require an
abortion to protect their lives or health.
Christopher Vincent Albanese
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
CPLR 3101(d)(2): Appellate Division, Third Department holds
that surveillance videotapes may not be discovered unless party
seeking discovery has a "substantial need" and cannot obtain
"substantial equivalent" without "undue hardship"
New York's liberal standard of discovery, embodied in CPLR
3101(a), seeks to ensure full disclosure prior to trial of all informa-
tion that is "material and necessary." 1 This rule promotes the
38 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163-64. A state may proscribe abortion in the third
trimester to further its interest in protecting fetal life "except when [an abortion] is neces-
sary to preserve the life or health of the mother." Id. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the state interest in protecting potential life can never outweigh the su-
perior state interest of protecting the life and health of the mother. See id.
The New York State Legislature contends that PCAP is constitutional because the
State has a compelling objective in promoting potential life and PCAP is set up only to
achieve that objective. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 975. This rationale, however, treats the
pregnant woman as a mere incubator whose sole purpose is to produce a healthy baby even
if the results are fatal to the woman. Thus, the Legislature is ignoring the State's obligation
to promote the health of the pregnant woman. See id. at 981. As the Perales court stated,
"there can be no compelling justification for that medical assistance program which in prac-
tice endangers the health and lives of eligible women for whom an abortion is medically
necessary, women whom the Legislature has expressly identified as needy in regard to medi-
cal care." Id. at 982.
' See CPLR 3101(a) (McKinney 1991). "There shall be full disclosure of all evidence
material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden
of proof ...." Id. In order to promote full disclosure, courts read the phrase "material and
necessary" liberally to include "any facts bearing on th6 controversy which will assist prepa-
ration for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity." See Allen v.
Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 406, 235 N.E.2d 430, 432, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449,
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search for truth and facilitates optimal trial preparation.2 Under
CPLR 3101(e), a party seeking discovery has an absolute right to
"obtain a copy of his own statement." 3 However, "materials pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation" are conditionally protected
from discovery under CPLR 3101(d)(2).4 New York courts will
compel the disclosure of such materials only if "the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation
of the case and is unable without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." 5
452 (1968); see also In re Comstock's Will, 21 A.D.2d 843, 844, 250 N.Y.S.2d 753, 755 (4th
Dep't 1964) (quoting 3 WK&M T 3101.07) ("If there is any possibility that the information
is sought in good faith for possible use as evidence-in-chief or in rebuttal or for cross-exami-
nation, it should be considered 'evidence material ... in the prosecution or defense.' "). See
generally SIEGEL § 344, at 490-93 (discussing CPLR 3101(a)).
2 See Mudge v. Thomas J. Hughes Constr. Co., 16 A.D.2d 106, 107, 225 N.Y.S.2d 833,
836 (1st Dep't 1962) (encouraging liberal discovery to promote trial fairness and further
interests of justice). Courts expanded their interpretation of CPLR 3101(a) as the focus of
pretrial discovery shifted from the preservation of material for trial toward the full prepara-
tion of the case and expedition of the trial. See Southbridge Finishing Co. v. Golding, 2
A.D.2d 430, 434, 156 N.Y.S.2d 542, 546 (1st Dep't 1956) (examining witnesses before trial
gives both parties opportunity to gather evidence); see also Allen, 21 N.Y.2d at 406-07, 235
N.E.2d at 432, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 452 (quoting 3 WK&M 1 3101.07) (discovery permitted if
matter "sufficiently related to the issues in litigation to make the effort to obtain it in prep-
aration for trial reasonable"); Barber v. Town of Northumberland, 88 A.D.2d 712, 713, 451
N.Y.S.2d 291, 293 (3d Dep't 1982) (test for disclosure of facts bearing on controversy is 'one
of usefulness and reason').
The federal courts also encourage broad disclosure. See, e.g., Martin v. Long Island
R.R., 63 F.R.D. 53, 54-55 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (settlement discussions, authentication practices,
and trial preparation facilitated by discovery of surveillance videotapes).
CPLR 3101(e) (McKinney 1991).
See CPLR 3101(d)(2) (McKinney 1991); see also Dunning v. Shell Oil Co., 57 A.D.2d
16, 17-18, 393 N.Y.S.2d 129, 130-31 (3d Dep't 1977) (objective of CPLR 3101(d)(2) served by
discovery of expert reports prepared for litigation); Pinn v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 104
Misc. 2d 1112, 1115, 430 N.Y.S.2d 211, 213 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1980) (permitting dis-
covery of accident report where defendant could not demonstrate it was prepared solely for
litigation). See generally SIEGEL § 348, at 499-503 (discussing CPLR 3101(d)(2)).
There are three specific exceptions to the liberal discovery rule: "(1) privileged matter
(CPLR 3101, subd. [b]); (2) attorney's work product (CPLR 3101, subd. [c]); and (3) mate-
rial prepared for litigation (CPLR 3101, subd. [d])." Barber, 88 A.D.2d at 713, 451 N.Y.S.2d
at 293.
- CPLR 3101(d)(2) (McKinney 1991). Courts label these materials conditionally im-
mune because they are discoverable only upon satisfaction of the two statutory criteria. See,
e.g., Puntoriero v. Johnson, 115 A.D.2d 229, 229-30, 496 N.Y.S.2d 125, 125 (4th Dep't 1985)
(requiring defense to show that investigative reports prepared solely for defense cannot be
duplicated and without them party will be prejudiced); Greene v. Lee, 112 A.D.2d 140, 141,
490 N.Y.S.2d 830, 832 (2d Dep't 1985) (disallowing discovery of accident scene photographs
where substantial equivalent available); Austin v. Coastal Indus., 112 A.D.2d 123, 124, 491
N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (2d Dep't 1985) (no undue prejudice where requesting party had ample
opportunity to photograph device in question after incident); Rosado v. Mercedes-Benz, 90
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The classification of surveillance tapes-surreptitious video-
tapes of plaintiffs alleging personal injury-under these two provi-
sions of the CPLR has divided New York's judicial departments.'
This division stems from the parties' competing interests in the
surveillance tapes. The defendant seeks to keep the contents of the
tapes secretive, in hopes of impeaching the plaintiff's testimony,
while the plaintiff desires to expose manipulative filmmaking tech-
niques employed by the defendant by reviewing the tapes prior to
trial.7 In Marte v. W.O. Hickok Manufacturing Co.,8 the Appellate
Division, First Department, citing inter alia CPLR 3101(e), permit-
ted the discovery of surveillance tapes, but delayed disclosure until
the defendant "had the opportunity to depose fully the opposing
party, thereby memorializing that individual's testimony so it can
be utilized for impeachment purposes."" In Di Michel v. South
Buffalo Ry.,' 0 the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, also
permitted the discovery of surveillance tapes, but rejected the
First Department's analogy to CPLR 3101(e)." According to the
Di Michel court, surveillance tapes must be analyzed under CPLR
3101(d)(2).2 However, the Third Department reasoned that the
plaintiff had a substantial need for discovery because films are
subject to alteration and manipulation and "[flor that same rea-
son, it is impossible for [the] plaintiff to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the surveillance materials by other means."' 3 The
court concluded that surveillance tapes were by their very nature
discoverable under CPLR 3101(d)(2).' 4 Recently, in Careccia v.
A.D.2d 515, 515, 454 N.Y.S.2d 759, 760 (2d Dep't 1982) (plaintiff who hired expert to in-
spect automobile and then junked it not entitled to defendant's reports based on subse-
quent tests).
' See Departmental Dispute on Whether Surveillance Video Tapes of Personal Injury
Plaintiff Are Discoverable, N.Y. ST. L. DIG. (N.Y.S.B.A., David D. Siegel ed.), Mar. 1992, at
1-2 [hereinafter Departmental Dispute].
See CPLR 3101 commentary at 70 (McKinney 1991).
154 A.D.2d 173, 552 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1st Dep't 1990).
Id. at 177, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 300.
-0 - A.D.2d -, 579 N.Y.S.2d 788 (4th Dep't 1991).
Id. at - , 579 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
12 Id.
13 Id.
" Id.; see also Prewitt v. Beverly-50th St. Corp., 145 Misc. 2d 257, 258, 546 N.Y.S.2d
815, 816 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989) ("[Tlhe requisite substantial need is established by
the plaintiff's need to examine and perhaps test the films as to authenticity, and ... the
hardship in obtaining a substantial equivalent is manifest."); Jenkins v. Rainner, 350 A.2d
473, 477 (N.J. 1976) (procurement of substantial equivalent poses manifest hardship be-
cause videotapes are unique pieces of evidence that cannot be recreated).
[Vol. 66:526
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Enstrom,15 the Appellate Division, Third Department, rejected the
reasoning of the First and Fourth Departments and prohibited dis-
covery of surveillance tapes because the party requesting discovery
failed to demonstrate both an inability to duplicate the tapes and a
substantial need as required under CPLR 3101(d)(2).11
In Careccia, a motorcyclist brought suit against Rockland
County to recover for injuries sustained in a collision allegedly
caused by the county's negligent maintenance of an intersection.",
Following commencement of the action, surveillance films of the
injured plaintiff were recorded at the behest of the defense coun-
sel.' 8 The plaintiff sought to obtain these videotapes, but the de-
fendant refused to release them. 9 The Supreme Court, Rockland
County, granted the plaintiff's motion to compel the defendant to
release the videotapes, and the defendant appealed.2 0
The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed the Su-
preme Court's order on the grounds that surveillance tapes, made
It 174 A.D.2d 48, 578 N.Y.S.2d 678 (3d Dep't 1992).
16 Id. at 50-51, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 679-80. Regarding Marte's analogy to CPLR 3101(e),
the Careccia court held that "it is doubtful that the [Marte] holding was premised on that
provision which 'enables a party to unconditionally obtain a copy of his or her own state-
ment.'" Id. at 50, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 679 (quoting Sands v. News Am. Publications, 161
A.D.2d 30, 40, 560 N.Y.S.2d 416, 422 (1st Dep't 1990)). Regarding Di Michel's presumption
of discoverability, the Careccia court stated that it was "unwilling to conclude that the ele-
ments necessary for an order for production under CPLR 3101(d)(2) are inherent in the
very nature of the visual evidence." Id. at 51, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
The dispute in Careccia arose in the Second Department, but was transferred to the
Third Department pursuant to a program that was recently implemented to ease the Second
Department's case load. See Departmental Dispute, supra note 6, at 1. An interesting ques-
tion of law arising out of such transfers is whether the transferee court should apply the law
of its own department or the law of the transferor's department. See id. at 1-2; David D.
Siegel, The Second Department's Transferred Cases: Whose Law Applies in a Conflict?,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 23, 1990, at 1.
'7 Careccia v. Enstrom, 171 A.D.2d 928, 928, 566 N.Y.S.2d 976, 977 (3d Dep't 1991).
The plaintiff, while operating his motorcycle, collided with defendant Enstrom at the haz-
ardous intersection. Id. at 928, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 977.
8 Careccia, 174 A.D.2d at 49, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 679. Although the exact contents of
these videotapes were not revealed, it can be presumed that the films were intended to
refute the extent of the plaintiff's alleged injuries. See Marte v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 154
A.D.2d 173, 176, 552 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299 (1st Dep't 1990). "The primary reason for offering
visual reproductions of a plaintiff is to impeach his or her credibility and to undermine
plaintiff's claims regarding the physical injuries suffered .... " Id.; see also Olszewski v.
Howell, 253 A.2d 77, 78 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969) (surveillance videotapes are needed to protect
"against a possible exaggerated claim, [or] even false claim[s], of personal injury"); Bogatay
v. Montour R.R., 177 F. Supp. 269, 270 (W.D. Pa. 1959) (surveillance films can be used as
substantive evidence of injury or as impeachment material).
11 See Careccia, 171 A.D.2d at 928, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 977.
20 Careccia, 174 A.D.2d at 49, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
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after the commencement of a lawsuit, are conditionally protected
from discovery in that they are clearly "materials prepared for liti-
gation."'" The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that video-
tapes are absolutely discoverable under CPLR 3101(e) and main-
tained that surveillance videotapes are more akin to the report of
an investigator hired by defense counsel and, therefore, protected
from discovery under 3101(d)(2).22 The court also disagreed with
the Di Michel court's presumption of discoverability for surveil-
lance tapes, "for such a conclusion would effectively rewrite the
statute to create another exception to the rule governing material
prepared for litigation, which is the function of the Legislature, not
the courts."2 Justice Casey, writing for a unanimous court, con-
cluded that the party seeking discovery failed to carry the burden
of proving that he had a "substantial need" for the materials and
that he could not obtain their "substantial equivalent" without un-
due hardship. 4
It is submitted that the court's refusal to rely on CPLR
3101(e) and not to presume surveillance tapes discoverable under
Id. at 50-51, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 680. Photographs and similar devices are within the
scope of "materials" prepared for litigation. See, e.g., O'Connell v. Jones, 140 A.D.2d 676,
676, 529 N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 (2d Dep't 1988) (photographs are "material prepared for litigation
and conditionally immune from disclosure"); Saccente v. Toterhi, 35 A.D.2d 692, 692, 314
N.Y.S.2d 593, 594 (1st Dep't 1970) (CPLR 3101(d) analysis applies to photographs taken by
plaintiff of defendant after accident). But see Murdick v. Bush, 44 Misc. 2d 527, 528, 254
N.Y.S.2d 54, 55 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1964) (photographs of accident scene not pro-
tected by work product doctrine because not "product of the lawyers mind") (citation
omitted).
22 Careccia, 174 A.D.2d at 50, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 680 (rejecting Marte court's analogy of
photographs taken with party's permission).
The court determined that no correlation existed between the surveillance tapes and
CPLR 3101(e). See id. Those courts that have deemed photographs "party statements" ig-
nored work product arguments and concluded that an absolute right to discovery of this
material existed. See, e.g., Saccente, 35 A.D.2d at 692, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 594 (where infant
plaintiff allowed defendant to photograph him before retaining counsel court compelled dis-
covery deeming photograph equivalent to plaintiff's own statement).,
23 Careccia, 174 A.D.2d at 51, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 680 (citation omitted).
24 Id. at 51, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 680. The court stated:
The record in this case contains nothing to show that a pretrial examination or
testing of the videotapes would reveal anything relevant to their authenticity or
accuracy that could not be revealed through ordinary trial tactics, such as voir
dire and cross examination of the person who made the videotapes. Nor is there
anything in the record to show that when the request for the videotapes was made
plaintiff's condition had changed to such a degree that he could no longer produce
a videotape that would be a substantial equivalent of those obtained by
defendant.
Id. (citations omitted).
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CPLR 3101(d)(2) 25 is a warranted departure from previous deci-
sions. Regarding CPLR 3101(e), a surveillance videotape more
closely resembles testimony of a third party witness observing a
plaintiff's activities than a plaintiff's own statements.26 Videotapes,
therefore, should be treated as third party reports acquired at the
request of defense counsel and thus subject to the conditional pro-
tection of materials prepared for trial.
Regarding CPLR 3101(d)(2), the argument that the nature of
surveillance tapes inherently prevents the plaintiff from obtaining
their "substantial equivalent" and inherently creates a "substan-
tial need" is equally tenuous.28 Such an interpretation would con-
stitute an unnecessary rewriting of the statute by the judiciary. 29
The reason posited by the requesting party for discovering the sur-
veillance tapes-to test their validity and avoid later de-
lay-clearly does not rise to the level of "substantial need."'30 Simi-
larly, it should not be presumed that the party petitioning for
discovery cannot create the "substantial equivalent" of surveil-
lance films; the party requesting the material may be able to tes-
tify as to his or her own physical condition and to produce wit-
nesses to attest to his or her daily activities.3 ' It is further asserted
25 See id:
,1 See id.; accord Di Michel, - A.D.2d at -, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 788 ("[S]urveillance
material does not constitute a statement discoverable pursuant to CPLR 3101(e) .... "). But
see Ancona v. Net Realty Holding Trust Co., N.Y.L.J., April 22, 1992, at 26 (Sup. Ct. Nas-
sau County 1992); Prewitt v. Beverly-50th St. Corp., 145 Misc. 2d 257, 258, 546 N.Y.S.2d
815, 815 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989) (compelling discovery by analogy to CPLR 3101(e));
Marte, 154 A.D.2d at 177, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 299-300 (same). "If the videotapes at issue here
can be equated to any type of verbal or written evidence, the equivalent would'be the state-
ments or report of an investigator hired by defense counsel to observe plaintiff's daily activi-
ties, not the statements of plaintiff." Careccia, 174 A.D.2d at 50, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
17 See Careccia, 174 A.D.2d at 50, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
28 See id. at 51, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
29 See id. CPLR 3101(d)(1) discusses the additional discovery permitted when an ex-
pert witness testifies at trial. See CPLR 3101(d)(1) (McKinney 1991). Surveillance video-
tapes certainly cannot be classified as "expert witnesses," and according such treatment to
videotapes would protect a class of evidence that the Legislature never intended to protect.
See Careccia, 174 A.D.2d at 51, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
" See Di Michel, - A.D.2d at - , 579 N.Y.S.2d at 789 (Balio & Lawton, JJ., dis-
senting). "Although plaintiff expresses concern about the authenticity or accuracy of the
tape, those matters may be challenged during voir dire, cross-examination or rebuttal in the
manner traditionally used with photographs and recordings." Id.
Additionally, it is equally untenable that seeking discovery for the purpose of avoiding
an effective cross examination constitutes a "substantial need." Id.; see also Mort v. A/S
D/S Svendborg, 41 F.R.D. 225, 227-28 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (interrogatories intended to frustrate
effective cross-examination need not be answered).
, See Careccia, 174 A.D.2d at 51, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 680 ("ordinary trial tactics" suffi-
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that a rule which presumes that videotapes are inherently discov-
erable constitutes blind reliance by the judiciary on the general
proposition of broad discovery,32 and thus defeats the Legislature's
specific intent to protect "materials prepared for litigation."
In Marte, the First Department compelled disclosure of sur-
veillance videotapes, but delayed their disclosure until the request-
ing party was fully deposed. 3 The Careccia court stated that such
a compromise is statutorily precluded.3 4 It is suggested, however,
that where the requesting party sustains the burden of compelling
production, this condition would be proper under CPLR 3103(a),
which gives courts the discretion to "make a protective order deny-
ing, limiting, conditioning or regulating the use of any disclosure
device."35 Allowing the court this discretion with respect to the dis-
coverability of materials effectively balances competing interests
thus allowing acquisition of materials by a requesting party while
preserving the effectiveness of surveillance films for an adversary.36
From the defendant's perspective, a prediscovery deposition will
cient test of authenticity); see also Di Michel, - A.D.2d at - , 579 N.Y.S.2d at 789
(Balio & Lawton, JJ., dissenting). The dissent in Di Michel noted that a party has access to
the substantial equivalent because the
[pilaintiff is fully aware of the nature of his physical condition and the extent of
his disability. He makes no assertion that he lacks expert medical evidence to
support his position regarding injuries and disability or that he lacks witnesses
who can testify regarding his daily activities and habits.
Id. The burden of proof is on the party requesting the material to demonstrate the elements
necessary for the production of these materials. See Thibodeau v. Rob Leasing, Inc., 88
A.D.2d 1085, 1086, 452 N.Y.S.2d 722, 724 (3d Dep't 1982) (denying request because request-
ing party "failed to meet its burden of proof to demonstrate ... a change occurred sufficient
to require discovery"). But see Prewitt, 145 Misc. 2d at 258, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 816 (substan-
tial need established by plaintiff's need to examine and test films).
32 But see Mort, 41 F.R.D. at 227-28 (arguing that liberal discovery policy not furthered
where purpose of disclosing videotapes was to avoid impeachment).
33 Marte, 154 A.D.2d at 177, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 300. Other courts have also adopted this
balancing approach. See, e.g., Snead v. American Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, 59 F.R.D. 148,
151 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
11 See Careccia, 174 A.D.2d at 51, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
31 CPLR 3103(a) (McKinney 1991) (emphasis added). "The court may at any time on
its own initiative . . . make a protective order denying, limiting, conditioning, or regulating
the use of any disclosure device. Such order shall be designed to prevent unreasonable an-
noyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice to any person or the
courts." Id.; see also Altesman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 164 A.D.2d 876, 877, 559 N.Y.S.2d 563, 565
(2d Dep't 1990) (allowing protective order to prevent tailored testimony); Westchester
Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Marbach, 66 A.D.2d 335, 338, 413 N.Y.S.2d 411, 413 (2d Dep't
1979) (forbidding pretrial dissemination of deposition materials to press to protect parties'
interests).
31 See Blyther v. Northern Lines, 61 F.R.D. 610, 611-12 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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eliminate the temptation of the requesting party to alter his or her
testimony to conform to the film,a" and the uncertainty concerning
the contents of the films will ensure truthfulness.38 From the plain-
tiff's perspective, he or she is benefitted by having the time to test
the films prior to trial and thus protect against manipulative film-
making, or similar chicanery.9
Richard W. Viola
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(7): New York Court of Appeals broad-
ens scope of rule to include attorney criticism of the judiciary
New York's Code of Professional Responsibility (the "Code")'
has been viewed by the courts as the guidepost in determining the
bounds of lawyers' professional conduct.2 The Code's disciplinary
3 Id. at 612.
'8 See Snead v. American Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, 59 F.R.D. 148, 150 (E.D. Pa.
1973).
I d.
See N.Y.S.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (McKinney 1990) [hereinafter
CODE]. "The Code... points the way [for] the aspiring [attorneys] and provides standards
by which to judge the transgressor." Id. pmbl. at 354-55; see also N.Y.S.B.A. THE LAWYER'S
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. at 1 (1990) [hereinafter LAWYER'S CODE]. The
Code was first promulgated by the American Bar Association in 1969 and adopted by the
New York State Bar Association in 1970 as its official code of ethics. See N.Y. JUD. LAW
app. at 351 (McKinney 1975). In 1983, the American Bar Association drafted rules of profes-
sional conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES]. Although the Model Rules were never adopted by the New York Bar, they did serve
as the basis for major revisions in the 1970 Code. See LAWYER'S CODE, supra, letter insert
from the President of the New York State Bar Ass'n, dated September, 1990. These revi-
sions were ultimately adopted by the four judicial departments of the Appellate Division of
State Supreme Court, and promulgated as joint rules of the appellate divisions effective
September 1, 1990. See N.Y. JUD. LAW app. at 108 (McKinney Supp. 1992). The disciplinary
committees of the appellate divisions are responsible for the supervision of attorney conduct
and the establishment of standards by which to review such conduct. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(2)
(McKinney 1983); see also Grunberg v. Feller, 132 Misc. 2d 738, 741, 505 N.Y.S.2d 515, 517
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1986) (disciplinary committees of appellate divisions are
proper forums for complaints involving attorney misconduct).
2 See In re Hof, 102 A.D.2d 591, 596, 478 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (2d Dep't 1984) ("The disci-
plinary rules and ethical considerations set down in the Code of Professional Responsibility
... represent the acknowledged standards of the profession . . . ."). The Code consists of
Canons, which represent general principles of professional conduct expected of attorneys,
Ethical Considerations, which are aspirational and outline the objectives of the profession
